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UNITED STATES v. ADLMAN: PROTECTION FOR
CORPORATE WORK PRODUCT?*
Charles M. Yablon' & Steven S. Sparling"
INTRODUCTION

In the large law firms of America, there is a friendly but intense
rivalry between those lawyers who work primarily on pending
litigation and those who work mostly on counseling, negotiating,
and drafting documents relating to corporate transactions. Most
firms are structured into departments along these lines, so even the
newest lawyer knows whether she is "litigation" or "corporate."
Each group tends to socialize among itself and perpetrates scurrilous
stereotypes about the other: corporate lawyers are seen as dull and
pompous, litigators as overly aggressive and bombastic. The competition between these groups can become quite fierce at firm outings.
Litigators, however, have traditionally been able to claim one form
of legal recognition that their colleagues in the corporate department have been denied. Under standard views of the work-product
doctrine, most of the work produced by litigators has been protected from subsequent disclosure. The work produced by corporate
lawyers failed to merit the same degree of protection.
The recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in United States v. Adiman,' however, threatens
to disrupt this traditional dichotomy. It adopts a broad view of the
work-product doctrine that may well protect much of the material
generated by corporate as well as litigation departments. In Adiman,
the court extended work-product protection to a memorandum
prepared for a corporate client by an employee of the accounting
firm of Arthur Anderson & Co. who was both a lawyer and an accountant. 2 The memorandum discussed the tax implications of a
01998 Charles M. Yablon and Steven S. Spading. All Rights Reserved.
Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.
"Associate, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton. Special thanks to Nurit Ben-Harav,
Kenneth A. Dursht, and Seth B. Davis for their thoughtful edits.
134 F.3d 1194 (2d Cir. 1998).
2 Id. at 1195. The factual background of Adlman is set forth infra Part I.
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proposed restructuring by the client, likely tax challenges by the IRS
to the transaction, possible responses by the client, and made a
recommendation as to the preferred method for structuring the
transaction? Judge Leval, in a decision with which Judge Cabranes
joined and to which Judge Kearse dissented, held that the memorandum had potentially been prepared "in anticipation of litigation."
Therefore, the memorandum be protected as opinion work product
even though no litigation was pending or threatened at the time the
memorandum was prepared, and no such litigation would take
4
place unless the contemplated business transaction occurred.
In Adiman, the Second Circuit adopted an expansive interpretation of what it means for a document to be "prepared in anticipation of litigation" under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3)
("Rule 26(b)(3)"), s holding that the rule encompasses not just material prepared "primarily to assist in litigation" but all material created "because of" litigation.6 The court elucidated that test in the
terms previously suggested by Professors Wright and Miller as applicable when "in light of the nature of the document and the factual
situation in the particular case, the document can fairly be said to
have been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litigation."7 The court then went on to apply that test expansively, holding that the protection could be asserted with respect to prospective
litigation arising from events, like the proposed restructuring of the
corporation, that had not yet taken place.
This Article describes the decision in Adlman and explores its
implications, including the potential availability of work-product
protection to lawyers and others engaged in business and tax planning, preparation of financial statements and disclosures under the
securities laws, drafting of transactional documents, audit letters and
other tasks that have traditionally fallen within the scope of the
corporate law department.

3

See 134 F.3d at 1195.

4 See id. at 1204 (holding that such documents could be prepared 'in

anticipation
of . . . litigation' if they 'would [not] have been prepared irrespective of the expected
litigation" and remanding the decision to the district court).
s FED. R. civ. P. 26(b)(3).
6 See Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1203.
7 Id. at 1202 (quoting 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2024, at 343 (2d ed. 1994)) (emphasis omitted).
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I. UNITED STATES V. ADLMAN
Adiman involved a proposed corporate restructuring in which
Sequa Corporation, an aerospace manufacturer, would merge two of
its wholly-owned subsidiaries, Atlantic Research Corporation and
Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corporation. The transaction was expected
to generate an enormous loss and a tax refund. Monroe Adlman, an
attorney who held the position of vice president for taxes at Sequa,
expected an IRS challenge and lawsuit when, and if, Sequa claimed
such a refund.8 Adlman requested that Paul Sheahen, an accountant
and lawyer at Arthur Anderson & Co. "evaluate the tax implications
"
of the proposed restructuring. '
On September 5, 1989, Sheahen submitted a fifty-eight page
memorandum. It contained a detailed legal analysis of likely IRS
challenges to the reorganization and the resulting tax refund claim,
as well as the authorities on which the IRS might rely. Sheahen then
proposed possible legal theories or strategies for Sequa to adopt in
response, recommended preferred methods of structuring the transaction, and made predictions about the likely outcome of litigation.1" Guided by Sheahen's memorandum, Sequa effectuated the
merger, which resulted in a $289 million loss and an eventual $35
million tax refund. 1 As anticipated, the IRS audited Sequa and demanded, inter alia, the production of Sheahen's memorandum.
Sequa denied this request, citing work-product protection. The IRS
served a summons on Adlman and, when production was refused,
brought an enforcement proceeding in the United States District
2
Court for the Southern District of New York.'

See id. at 1195.
9 Id.

"0 The memorandum provided:

detailed legal analysis of likely IRS challenges to the reorganization and the
resulting tax refund claim; it contained discussion of statutory provisions, IRS
regulations, legislative history, and prior judicial and IRS rulings relevant to the
claim. It proposed possible legal theories or strategies for Sequa to adopt in
response, recommended preferred methods of structuring the transaction, and
made predictions about the likely outcome of litigation.

Id.

11Sequa's 1989 tax return used the loss to offset 1986 capital gains, resulting in the
$35 million refund. See Adlman, 134 F.3d. at 1195.
12 See id. at 1195-96.
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In that proceeding, Adiman asserted that the memorandum was
protected by both the attorney-client privilege and work-product
doctrine. Judge Knapp rejected the attorney-client privilege claim,
holding that Arthur Andersen & Co. had not been consulted to give
legal advice. 3 He held the work-product doctrine inapplicable
because the memorandum was prepared in contemplation of events
that had not yet occurred and, therefore, not in anticipation of
actual litigation. 4 Accordingly, Judge Knapp granted the IRS
petition to enforce the subpoena.
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed Judge Knapp's rejection
of the attorney-client privilege claim but vacated the district court's
enforcement order with respect to the work-product doctrine. The
court held that while the non-occurrence of events giving rise to
litigation prior to preparation of the documents was a factor to be
considered, it did not necessarily preclude the application of workproduct protection.'
On remand, Adlman contended that the memorandum was
fairly prepared in "anticipation of litigation," as litigation was "virtually certain" to result from the merger. 6 Adlman noted that the IRS
had annually audited Sequa for over thirty years and that the loss
and refund generated from the merger legally compelled the IRS to
file a report with the Joint Congressional Committee on Taxation.'
Moreover, Adlman contended that the novel interpretation of the
tax code employed for the Sequa merger, for which there were no
IRS decisions or cases on point, made litigation inevitable. 8 The
district court rejected this argument 9 and Adlman appealed again.
Judge Leval of the United States Court of Appeals noted that
Adlman's appeal presented a question of first impression for the
Second Circuit: "whether Rule 26(b)(3) is inapplicable to a litigation
analysis prepared by a party ... to inform a business decision

which turns on the party's assessment of the likely outcome of
13 See

United States v. Adiman, No. M-18-304, 1994 WL 191869, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
May 16, 1994) (holding that Arthur Anderson & Co. had not been contacted in the
pursuit of legal advice). This portion of the district court's ruling was later affirmed. See
United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1449-1500 (2d Cir. 1995).
14See Adlman, 1994 WL 191869, at *3.
15 See Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1196 (citing Adlman, 68 F.3d at 1501).
16 Id.
17 See id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6405(a) (1994)).
16 See id.
19 See United

Feb. 27, 1996).

States v. Adlman, No. M-18-304, 1996 WL 84502, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
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litigation expected to result from the transaction."" Obviously, the
memorandum in Adiman was not prepared solely, or even primarily, to aid in litigation. It had a clear business purpose-to provide
guidance to the company in its restructuring as well as to provide a
risk-assessment of potential litigation. On the other hand, the document had clear legal purposes. It set forth, analyzed, and evaluated
the strength of the claims the IRS was likely to make in subsequent
litigation." Thus, the question presented to the Second Circuit was
whether a memorandum which analyzed potential claims in a lawsuit arising from events that had not yet occurred, and prepared
primarily for business planning purposes, could nevertheless be
protected by the work-product doctrine. The Second Circuit's answer, by a two-to-one margin, was that the memorandum could be
protected.
In arriving at this result, the majority rejected an interpretation
of the phrase "in anticipation of litigation"22 set forth by the Fifth
Circuit which holds that documents are work product only if they
are created "primarily [ I to assist in future litigation."23 Instead, it
adopted the more expansive interpretation proposed by Wright and
Miller that such documents are protected as work product when
they are prepared "because of" litigation.24 The court noted that
the work-product doctrine was intended to protect documents that
set forth legal theories and analysis, and excluding documents from
work-product protection merely because the legal analysis contained in them served other business purposes would severely undermine such protection." Accordingly, the court held that "the

10See Adlman,

134 F.3d at 1197.

2, See id.

See id. Only documents prepared 'in anticipation of litigation" are protected by
the work product doctrine. See infra Part II.
' See United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982). The El Paso case
is discussed infra Part II.A.
24 Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1198.

See id. at 1199:
[T]he [work product doctrine] takes pains to grant special protection to the
types of materials at issue in this case-documents setting forth legal analysis. . . . []t would oddly undermine [the doctrine's] purposes if such documents were excluded from protection merely because they were prepared to
assist in the making of a business decision expected to result in the litigation.
(citation omitted).
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fact that a document's purpose is business-related appears irrelevant
to the question whether it should be protected under Rule
26(b)(3)." 26
The Second Circuit expressly adopted the expansive and somewhat vague Wright and Miller test for determining whether documents are prepared in anticipation of litigation: i.e., whether, "in
light of the nature of the document and the factual situation in the
particular case, the document [could] fairly be said to have been
prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litigation."27 The
court cautioned, however, that actual or anticipated litigation must
play a causal role in the creation of the document. "[D]ocuments
that are prepared in the ordinary course of business or that would
have been created in essentially similar form irrespective of the
litigation" are not protected. 28 This, according to the majority,
would largely exclude from protection documents prepared
pursuant to regulatory statutes.29
Judge Kearse dissented, arguing that the court had "extended
the work product privilege to a stage that precedes any possible
'anticipation' of litigation."30 She noted that the memorandum merely contemplated events that had yet to occur, and that any documents so causally remote from actual or threatened lawsuits could
not be considered prepared "in anticipation of litigation."3 '
26

Id. at 1200.

27

Id. at 1202 (quoting WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 2024, at 343) (emphasis

omitted).
28Id.

' See Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1201 n.5 (rejecting the Seventh Circuit's holding in In
re Special September 1978 Grand Jury (II), 640 F.2d 49, 61-62 (7th Cir. 1980), in
which the court held that the compelled creation of documents by regulation did not
necessarily strip those documents of work product protection). The Adiman court declined to foreclose completely work product protection of regulatorially compelled documents. See id. ('Since the documents at issue [in Special September 1978 Grand Jury]
were required to be prepared under Illinois law, it is arguable that they were not prepared 'because of' litigation.') (emphasis added).
The court also held that the IRS had failed to demonstrate the requisite need to
overcome the memorandum's work product protection. See id. at 1204. The Second
Circuit remanded the case to the district court, stating that the applicability of the work
product doctrine to the memorandum hinged 'on whether it would have been prepared
irrespective of the expected litigation with the IRS." Id.
o Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1205 (Kearse, J., dissenting).
See id.:
Where the only prospect of litigation is what would be anticipated if the party
undertakes a contemplated transaction but not otherwise, and the materials in
question were prepared in connection with providing legal advice to the party
as to whether or not to undertake that transaction, I do not regard the materi-
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Judge Kearse observed that such documents would frequently still
be protected under standard principles of the attorney-client
privilege.32
II. THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE

To fully appreciate the impact of the Adiman decision, it is first
necessary briefly to consider the mechanics and background of the
work-product doctrine. The work-product doctrine provides qualified immunity from discovery to materials prepared in anticipation
of litigation.33 While ordinary work-product protection may be
overcome by showing a "substantial need" for the materials and
"undue hardship" in obtaining the substantial equivalent by other
means, the work-product doctrine provides virtually absolute protection to materials containing a lawyer's mental impressions and
opinions.34
The work-product doctrine is broader than the attorney-client
privilege.3" For example, work-product immunity is not waived

id.

al as having been prepared "inanticipation of litigation.'

See id.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). See generally 6 JAMEs WM. MOORE ET AL, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.70[1], at 26-206 (3d ed. 1998); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7,
§ 2023, at 328-29. While usually thought of as embodied in Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the work product doctrine is actually somewhat broader
than the Federal Rule. It applies in situations not covered by the Federal Rules, like the
IRS subpoena involved in Adlman. Moreover, it was set forth by the Supreme Court in
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), as a matter of federal common law. The
Hickman decision is discussed infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
3
See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 2023, at 329 (noting that the work product doctrine "gave virtually absolute protection to an attorney's mental impressions, legal
theories, and the like."). The standard for attaining discovery of an attorney's work product opinion is not entirely clear. However, the circumstances for discovering such work
product are extremely limited: a party seeking discovery must demonstrate more than a
substantial need and undue burden. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,
401 (1981) ([The mental impressions of counsel] cannot be disclosed simply on a showing of substantial need and inability to obtain the equivalent without undue hardship.").
See generally MOORE ET AL, supra note 33, § 26.70[5][e], at 26-222 to 26-223 ("The
majority of federal courts ... have followed the better rule that 'opinion work product'
is subject to disclosure on a showing of extraordinary circumstances.').
" [Work product] is distinct from and broader than the attomey-client privilege,
which protects only communications between attorney and his client." In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 801 (3d Cir. 1979). The disparity in scope between the
work-product doctrine and the attomey-client privilege is derived from the distinct purposes underlying each doctrine. See, e.g., MOORE ET AL, supra note 33, § 26.70[8], at
26-228. Work-product immunity seeks to protect the adversarial system and the
32

33 See
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necessarily by intentional disclosure to a third party and may be
invoked by the client or the attorney. 6 Moreover, unlike the attorney-client privilege, both the client and lawyer may assert workproduct immunity. 7 Consequently, the crime-fraud exception to
privileges does not prevent the attorney from asserting work-product
protection, assuming that the lawyer is unaware of the client's
wrongdoing. 8
Despite the work-product doctrine's broad scope, there are a
plethora of manners in which the immunity can be waived. Failure
to assert work-product protection constitutes a waiver. 9 In addition, there is a work-product waiver where intentional disclosure is
made to a third party and such disclosure creates a substantial danger of disclosure to an adversary.4" Inadvertent disclosure to an
adversary will amount to a waiver if four factors are established:
whether the party seeking discovery was misled by the inadvertent
disclosure; whether precautions were taken against accidental disclosure; the time it took for the party seeking work-product immunity to discover the inadvertent disclosure; and notions of fair play
and justice.41 Moreover, work-product immunity is waived if the
substance of the document is placed in issue by the party seeking
protection.42 Even if waived, however, work-product protection
may continue to operate in subsequent proceedings. 3
The work-product doctrine originated in the landmark Supreme
Court decision in Hickman v. Taylor.' It should be noted that
even that granddaddy of all work-product cases involved materials
prepared for a lawsuit that had not yet occurred-notes taken by a

attorney's thoughts and impressions. See id. In contrast, the attorney-client privilege safeguards client confidences, seeking to preserve the lawyer-client relationship and candor
therein. See id.
36 See MOORE ET AL, supra note 33, § 26.70[6][a], at 26-225.
See MOORE ET AL, supra note 33, § 26.70[8], at 26-228.
n See MOORE Er AL, supra note 33.
31 See MOORE ET AL, supra note 33, § 26.70[6][b], at 26-226.
40 See MOORE ET AL, supra note 33, § 26.7016][c], at 26-226; see also In re
Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 1993).
41 See MOORE ET AL., supra note 33. Inadvertent disclosure also raises an interesting
37

question of whether opposing counsel is ethically obligated to refrain from reading patently accidental disclosure of confidential information. See generally id. at 26-226.1.
4' See MOORE E- AL, supra note 33.
43 See MOORE ETAL, supra note 33; see also In re: Steinhardt, 9 F.3d at 236 ('[We

decline to adopt a per se rule that all voluntary disclosures to the government waive
work product protection.").
" 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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lawyer for the owners of the tug boat J.M. Taylor during interviews
with survivors of the mysterious sinking of the tug boat. The interviews took place about a month after the sinking, and over seven
months before Hickman's lawsuit was filed." In short, even the
earliest of these cases recognized that work-product protection
extends to documents where litigation is in prospect but has not yet
actually occurred. Adiman, however, represents the latest in a long
line of cases that have tried to delineate how imminent, how close,
and how certain the prospect of litigation must be in order
for material to qualify as prepared "inanticipation of litigation."

Ill.

ANTICIPATION OF LITIGATION

Concerns about litigation underlie most of the work that lawyers perform. Contracts are drafted so that their intended terms will
be enforceable in litigation. Opinions of counsel prophesy the likely
result if the issue under consideration were submitted to a court in
the relevant jurisdiction. Much of the work of lawyers in advising
clients and negotiating with respect to transactions is conducted
against the background that if things go wrong, the matter will wind
up in litigation. It is not surprising, therefore, that the courts have
had difficulty determining exactly when material has been prepared
"inanticipation of litigation" and how imminent the prospective
litigation must be to warrant work-product coverage.46 Can the
immunity include documents created in an effort to avoid or discourage litigation?47 Moreover, in our litigious society*where near-

" The complaint named the two tug boat owners individually and in their capacity
as partners, as well as the railroad which owned the ship that the J.M. Taylor was
assisting when the accident occurred. See id.
' See United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 542 (5th Cir. 1982). ('[We
concede that determining whether a document is prepared in anticipation of litigation is
a slippery task.'); MOORE ET AL, supra note 33, § 26.70[3][a], at 26-210.1 ("Courts have
devised various formulations regarding just how concrete the prospect of litigation must
be before protection will attach to a given document.'); Thomas Wilson, Note, The
Work Product Doctrine: Why Have an Ordinary Course of Business Exception?, 1988
CoLUM. Bus. L. REv. 587, 594 ("Courts have failed to formulate a single standard for
determining whether the materials in question were 'prepared in anticipation of
litigation.'").
11 Cf. United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1199-2000 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting
that the question of whether corporate documents are primarily prepared for litigation is
an uneasy task and providing hypothetical circumstances in which the policies underlying the work product doctrine should apply to corporate documents); El Paso, 682 F.2d
at 534 (discussing the difficult risk-management decisions facing large corporations).
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ly all business documents contemplate the possibility of litigation,
how is it possible to distinguish documents prepared in anticipation
of litigation from those that are discoverable because they are
"prepared in the ordinary course of business?"48
Surprisingly, until the Adiman case, the Second Circuit had
never had occasion to interpret the phrase "in anticipation of litigation" found in Rule 26(b)(3). Other federal courts, however, had
reached various-often conflicting-views as to the meaning of that
phrase. This Part traces the case law development of the meaning of
"in anticipation of litigation" and the impact of Adlman on such
development. The driving policy behind the work-product doctrine
is to preserve the adversarial nature of litigation by protecting material that one side has prepared in anticipation of litigation from
discovery by the other. 9 Courts have tended to construe "in anticipation of litigation" broadly"° to avoid the perceived unfairness of
giving one party access to the other's litigation planning and analysis. They have employed a number of different fact-based inquiries
to determine whether a sufficient nexus exists between the
documents and litigation."1
There are two essential questions raised in construing the
meaning of "in anticipation of litigation." As to the first-what constitutes litigation-federal courts have generally agreed on a broad
definition that includes not only judicial proceedings but also governmental investigations, 2 grand jury subpoenas," and arbitrations and negotiations. 4 In addition to construing "litigation," howThe ordinary course of business exception is discussed below. See infra notes
128-34 and accompanying text.
41 See El Paso, 682 F.2d at 542 (*The accent in Hickman was on a lawyer's need
for a sphere of privacy in preparing a lawsuit.'); Jeff A. Anderson et al., Note, Special
Project: Work Product Doctrine, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 760, 843 (1983).
1oSee Anderson et al., supra note 49, at 844-45 ('[A] party is aided by the fact that
the anticipation of litigation standard is broader than a strict reading of that language
might imply.").
s' See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 2024, at 339.
52 See Martin v. Monfort, Inc., 150 F.R.D. 172, 173 (D. Colo. 1993) (holding that in
anticipation of litigation may include an investigation by a federal agency when there
are reasonable grounds to anticipate that litigation will arise). See generally MOORE ET
AL, supra note 33, § 26.7014], at 26-217.
11 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397 (1981); see also United
States v. Rockwell Int'l, 897 F.2d 1255, 1265 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying the work product
doctrine to a case involving an IRS summons).
' See Samuels v. Mitchell, 155 F.R.D. 195, 200 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (holding arbitrations to be sufficiently adversarial to constitute litigation); Reavis v. Metropolitan Property
& Liab. Ins., 117 F.R.D. 160 (S.D. Cal. 1987) (applying work product protection to
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ever, a court must also decide what it means to be prepared "in
anticipation of" such litigation. This raises the always thorny issue of
legal causation. A court must examine the nexus between the creation of the materials and the litigation at issue to determine whether a legally sufficient causal relationship exists between their
creation and the prospective litigation."5
Courts construing the work-product doctrine have struggled to
delineate a standard to determine when a document has been created in anticipation of prospective litigation.5" They have applied
several tests, including the prospect test, 7 the specific claim or
concrete facts test,5 8 more-than-remote-possibility test, 9 and eye

toward litigation test.60 These cases revealed a variety of factual
circumstances in which federal courts were willing to hold that
documents were protected under the work-product umbrella:61
documents prepared for litigation that never occurred;62 multi-purpose documents that aimed towards litigation and other condocuments created during negotiations aimed towards avoiding litigation).

-1 See MOORE ET AL,
supra note 49, at 845.
56 See MOORE ET AL,
supra note 7, § 2024, at
supra note 46, at 594-95.
17 See National Union

supra note 33, § 26.7013][a], at 26-210.1; Anderson et al.,
supra note 33, § 26.70[3][a], at 26-210.1; WRIGHT & MILLER,
343 n.10; Anderson et al., supra note 49, at 844-46; Wilson,

Fire Ins. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967 F.2d 980, 984 (4th
Cir. 1992); Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 624 (8th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Exxon Corp., 87 F.R.D. 624, 638 (D.D.C. 1980); Miles v. Bell Helicopter Co., 385 F. Supp. 1029, 1033 (N.D. Ga. 1974). See generally WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 7, § 2024, at 343 n.10; Anderson et al., supra note 49, at 845.
51 See Linde Thomson Langworthy Kohn & Van Dyke v. Resolution Trust Corp., 5
F.3d 1508, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Maertin v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 172 F.R.D.
143, 148 (D.NJ. 1997); Reich v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, Inc., 172 F.R.D. 58, 61
(W.D.N.Y. 1997); United States v. Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., 957 F. Supp. 301, 305
(D. Mass. 1997); Status Time Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 95 F.R.D. 27, 29 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718, 725 n.6 (N.D. III. 1978);
Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 42-43 (D. Md. 1974). This test is the
origin of the Wright and Miller test adopted by the Adiman court. See Anderson et al.,
supra note 49, at 845-46. See generally WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 2024, at
343.
19 See Fox v. California Sierra Fin. Servs., 120 F.R.D. 520, 524 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
5o See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947); Sterling Drug Inc. v. Harris,
488 F. Supp. 1019, 1026 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); United States v. Bonnell, 483 F. Supp. 1070,
1078 (D. Minn. 1979); Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp. v. Imoco-Gateway Corp., 62 F.R.D.
454, 457 (N.D. III. 1974).
" See generally MOORE ET AL, supra note 33, § 26.70[3][a], at 26-210.2 to 26-212;
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 2024, at 343 n.10.
389-90 (D. Minn.
2 See Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Tonka Corp., 140 F.R.D. 381,
1992); Home Ins. v. Ballenger Corp., 74 F.R.D. 93, 101 (D. Ga. 1977); Amey v. Geo.
A. Hormel & Co., 53 F.R.D. 179, 180 (D. Minn. 1971).
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cerns; 63 documents prepared after a claim was filed;' and documents created at the request of counsel, 5 in addition to documents
prepared primarily for litigation.66 Conversely, courts tended to exclude documents from work-product protection when they found
that the prospect of litigation was too remote,67 or where the documents were prepared in the ordinary course of business. 68 A nowabandoned line of cases denied work-product protection to
documents prepared at the instigation of a nonlawyer. 9
Emerging from this morass of tests-the existence of which is
partially due to the fact-intensive inquiry generated by the workproduct doctrine-is the common principle that courts will examine
the circumstances surrounding the creation of a document, and the
purpose for which it was created, in considering whether a sufficient causal nexus to litigation exists so as to apply work-product
protection.7" Although the Adiman court noted a dichotomy between courts that apply the primary purpose test and those that
adopt Wright and Miller's "because of litigation" test, there are, as
shown below,7 1 substantial differences even among those courts
that apply the more popular "because of litigation" standard. Among
such courts, the Second Circuit's Adiman .decision stands out as
perhaps the most expansive interpretation of the work-product
doctrine.

See United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1202 (2d Cir. 1998). In addition,
Adiman stands for the proposition that the work product doctrine may apply to documents considering litigation that may stem from events that have not even occurred. See
MOORE ETAL, supra note 33, § 26.70[3][a], at 26-210.2 n.27.
See Spaulding v. Denton, 68 F.R.D. 342, 345 (D. Del. 1975).
See United States v. O'Neill, 619 F.2d 222, 227 (3d Cir. 1980).
6 See United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 542 (5th Cir. 1982).
67 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 121 F. Supp. 792, 795 (D. Del.
1954).
See Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1202; El Paso, 682 F.2d at 542.
69 See Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 54 F.R.D. 367, 372 (N.D.
III. 1972). This line of cases has largely been abandoned. See generally MOORE ETAL,
supra note 33, § 26.70[3][c], at 26-213.
70 See MOORE ET AL., supra note 33, § 26.70[3][a], at 26-210.1; Anderson et al.,
supra note 49, at 845.
7' Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1198. The Adiman decision probably paints with too broad
a brush. The case law on anticipation does not reflect the sharp dichotomy between the
primary purpose and because of test as suggested by the Second Circuit. Indeed, several
courts applying the because of test rely on primary purpose case law. See infra Part
III.D. The two categories proffered by the Adlman court, however, provide a fair sketch
of the respective ends of the work product spectrum.
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A. The Primary Purpose Test: United States v. El Paso Co.
The primary purpose test is associated with the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, the only circuit to adopt it expressly. The primary
purpose standard requires that the "'primary motivating purpose
behind the creation of the document [is] to aid in possible future
litigation." 72 The Fifth Circuit's primary purpose test was first fully
articulated in 1981," and is illustrated best by the circuit's
decision in United States v. El Paso Co.74
El Paso Company ("El Paso") was a holding company for several corporations, principally located in Texas.7 Due to its immense
size, El Paso's in-house staff "expend[ed] over 10,000 hours" annually in preparing its tax return. 76 As part of its tax return preparation, El Paso created "tax-pool analysis" documents. These documents summarized El Paso's contingent tax liabilities, areas in
which it was thought the company's return might be challenged and
additional taxes assessed.77 The IRS audited El Paso annually and
sought disclosure of the tax-pool analysis documents.7 El Paso
refused, citing work-product protection.7 9
In considering El Paso's work-product claim, the Fifth Circuit
discussed the various reasons for preparing such tax-pool analysis
documents. The court noted that the tax code contains vast "gray
areas," which require a large company to ascertain potential IRS
challenges to the company's good-faith decisions in allocating assets
within a given return.80 In addition, public companies are compelled to ascertain and disclose contingent future tax liabilities by
the Securities and Exchange Commission.81 The Fifth Circuit
deemed it significant that the tax-pool analysis documents did not

I2 United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 542 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting United
States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir. 1981)).
73 See Davis, 636 F.2d at 1040.
74 El Paso, 682 F.2d at 542.
1 El Paso held 67 subsidiaries. See id. at 533.
76

Id.

See id. at 532.
I See id. Specifically, the IRS requested "'all analyses prepared by the El Paso Company regarding potential tax liabilities and tax problems." Id. at 533.
1 See El Paso, 682 F.2d at 533 (noting that the head of El Paso's tax department
simply returned the request to the IRS marked 'refused').
80 See id. at 534. Indeed, the court noted that: *To thread one's way through this
maze, the business or wealthy taxpayer needs the mind of a Talmudist and the patience
of Job.' Id.
81 See id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78(I) (1994).
7
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assist in the filing of a tax return but were prepared subsequent to
filing.82 Moreover, the documents did not require the input of an
attorney and were prepared primarily for financial reporting purposes, rather than for any specific charge by the IRS or any imminent
lawsuit.83
The Fifth Circuit denied El Paso's work-product claim solely on
the basis that the tax-pool analysis documents were not prepared in
anticipation of litigation." The court held that "'[l]itigation need
not be imminent ... as long as the primary motivating purpose
behind the creation of the document was to aid in possible future
litigation."'85 Applying this standard to the tax-pool analysis documents, the El Paso court found that such documents were prepared
largely due to securities regulation requirements." The court noted
that outside counsel handled El Paso's specific litigation claims, and
that the tax-pool analysis documents were prepared without outside
counsel's involvement. 7 With respect to litigation theories mentioned in the tax-pool analysis documents, the Fifth Circuit found
that these portions of the documents pertained to general, tenuous
litigation concerns, rather than to any specific preparation for
trial.88 Ultimately, the court held that the documents "carrie[d]
much more the aura of daily business than [they did] of courtroom
combat."89
Thus, the El Paso primary purpose test mandates that the court
determine the single, primary purpose for which a document has
been created and protect only those documents created primarily to
82 El Paso, 682 F.2d at 534.

' See id. at 534-35; see also id. at 535 ('The tax pool analysis is undertaken solely
to insure that the corporation sets aside on its balance sheet a sufficient amount to
cover contingent tax liability.").
4 See id. at 542 ('Even assuming that El Paso's tax pool analysis otherwise qualifies
for work product protection . . . the doctrine {is] unavailable here because the tax pool
analysis is not prepared 'in anticipation of litigation.").
85 Id. at 542-43 (quoting United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir.
1981)).
I See id. at 543 ('[The primary motivation is to anticipate, for financial reporting
purposes, what the impact of litigation might be on the company's tax liability.").
This observation assisted in satisfying the Fifth
87 See El Paso, 682 F.2d at 543.
Circuit's inquiry as to whether the tax-pool analysis had a sufficient link to any concrete
prospects of litigation. See id. ('El Paso's tax pool analysis is ... distant from actual
litigation . . .

).

m See id. at 543-44 ('The tax pool analysis concocts theories about the results of
possible litigation; such analyses are not designed to prepare a specific case for trial or
negotiation.).
89 Id. at 544.
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aid in a particular, anticipated litigation. Although the El Paso court
specifically stated that litigation did not have to be imminent to
qualify for work-product protection, it should be noted that in El
Paso, the documents at issue had been prepared at a time when the
prospect of litigation was quite remote and hypothetical.
B. The "Because of Litigation" Test: Binks Manufacturing Co. v.
National Presto Industries
In Binks Manufacturing Co. v. National Presto Industries," the
Seventh Circuit applied the Wright and Miller "because of litigation" test; yet, it did so in a way that limited application of workproduct protection to litigation that was fairly imminent and involved "articulable" claims. The case arose out of a dispute involving an "industrial spray finishing and baking system," which Presto
had previously purchased from Binks Manufacturing Company. 9'
The system did not function properly. Presto claimed it had been
improperly manufactured; Binks claimed that Presto was not
operating the system properly.92
At issue in the case were three memoranda prepared by an inhouse Presto attorney who had traveled to the Presto plant where
the faulty system was installed.93 The first memorandum, addressed
to Presto's general counsel, set forth a recommended strategy to be
employed in negotiations with Binks.94 A second memorandum,
also addressed to the general counsel, entitled "Evaluation of Binks
Situation," described a conversation between the lawyer and three
Presto executives and detailed problems with the baking system.9"
A third memorandum from the lawyer also detailed the system's
malfunction and sought to allocate responsibility between Presto
and Binks for the system's breakdowns.96 The trial court granted
work-product protection to the first memorandum but not the other
97

two.

90 709 F.2d 1109 (7th Cir. 1983).

91 Id. at 1111.
92 Id.
9' See
' See
95 See
See

id. at 1113.
id.
Binks Mfg. Co., 709 F.2d at 1113.
id.

See id.
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On appeal, the Seventh Circuit, while citing the Wright and
Miller test, also approvingly cited prior case law which held that
"[t]he mere contingency that litigation may result is not determinative."98 The court sought to distinguish between routine investigations of possible claims conducted in the ordinary course of business and those in which there is a clear intent to litigate.99 Reviewing the circumstances which had lead to the creation of the lawyer's
memoranda in Binks, the court found no indication that the parties
thought litigation was imminent or even likely to occur. To this
effect, the court stated:
We conclude though, that while there may have been "the remote prospect of litigation' when [Presto's lawyer] prepared his memoranda, the
appellant has failed to meet its burden of proving that the memoranda
were "prepared ...because of the prospect of litigation" or, that "some
°°
articulable claim, likely to lead to litigation" had arisen.'

The Seventh Circuit in Binks sought to limit the scope of the
"because of litigation" test by holding that any prospective litigation
must be likely and not remote at the time the document at issue is
created. This is seen most clearly in the court's statements concerning the first memorandum, which recommended negotiating strategies based on a lawyer's evaluation of the claim, and seems most
clearly to include legal opinions and analyses, which was held by
the lower court to be protected by the work-product doctrine. The
lower court's ruling with respect to this document had not been
appealed. However, the Seventh Circuit stated, consistent with
their ruling in Binks, that even the first memorandum was
not protected as work product.
C. Further Articulation of Anticipation of Litigation Standards
While the Seventh Circuit in Binks sought to limit the scope of
the "because of litigation" test in terms of imminence and likelihood
of litigation, the Eighth Circuit, in Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co.,'
sought to reintroduce concepts of "purpose" into the "because of
litigation" test. At issue in Simon were "risk-management docu-

See id. at 1118-19 (citing janicker v. George Washington Univ., 94 F.R.D. 648,
650 (D.D.C. 1982)).
9 See id. at 1120.
1o Binks Mfg. Co., 709 F.2d at 1120 (citations omitted).
1o1816 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987).
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ments." °2 These documents were prepared by defendant Searle
"in an attempt to keep track of, control, and anticipate the cost of
Searle's product liability litigation."" °3 When such suits were filed
against Searle, its legal department prepared reserve estimates which
"embody the attorney's estimate of anticipated legal expenses, settlement value, length of time to resolve the litigation, geographic
considerations, and other factors."" ° These individual analyses
were then sent to the risk-management department where they were
aggregated and used for a variety of business planning purposes
including budget, profit, and insurance considerations.
After reciting the Wright and Miller test and the ordinary course
of business exception, the Eighth Circuit concluded that "we do not
believe it can be said that the risk management documents were
prepared for purposes of litigation."' The risk management department in Simon "was not involved in giving legal advice or in
mapping litigation strategy in any individual case."' 6 It would
seem, therefore, that in the Eighth Circuit's view, the purpose for
which these documents were prepared disqualified them from workproduct protection. However, the Simon decision went on to say
that to the extent such documents "disclose the individual case reserves calculated by Searle's attorneys,"" 7 they were exempt from
disclosure. There is an anomaly in this holding, which the dissent in
Simon points out.0 8 If the documents in Simon were not prepared
in anticipation of litigation, then no part of them should be protected as work product. Yet, it is also clear that the individual case reserves, which involve lawyer evaluation of pending litigation, implicate the core concerns of the work-product doctrine. The Simon
case may be read as holding that where such core concerns are
involved, a litigation purpose is either presumed or not required.

1 See id. at 399.
,01 Id. at 400.
101Id. at 400-01.
,01Id. at 401.
11 Simon, 816 F.2d at 401.

Id.
," Id. at 405 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
107
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Concerns about the purpose and motivation for the creation of
documents also appear in the Third Circuit's decision in United
States v. Rockwell International.°9 Similar to Adlman, Rockwell
International arose out of an IRS investigation but involved the
discovery of Rockwell's "free reserve file."" 0 Documents in that
file analyzed the "soft spots" in Rockwell's tax return, including the
possibility and consequences of an adverse IRS ruling with respect
to such soft spots, the likelihood of such a ruling and the various
negotiating and settlement positions."' In remanding the case for
further factual findings, the Third Circuit essentially applied the El
Paso "primary purpose" test, holding that the court below had to
make a factual determination "with specificity" as to "Rockwell's
motivation in creating and maintaining the free reserve file."" 2 If
it was maintained to "aid Rockwell in future negotiations and litigation with the IRS," it was protected. 1 3 If it was "maintained so
that Rockwell may comply with generally accepted accounting
principles and SEC reporting requirements," it was not." 4 The
opinion assumes that the lower court will determine one motivation
or another to be the primary purpose for the creation of the file.
In National Union Fire Ins. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co.,"' the
Fourth Circuit adopted a version of the Binks standard but made the
requirements of imminence and likelihood of litigation even clearer.
In remanding the case for further factual findings, the court found
that a vague concern about potential litigation would not be enough
to trigger work-product protection." 6 As it noted, "members of society tend to document transactions and occurrences to avoid the
foibles of memory and to perpetuate evidence for the resolution of
future disputes," but a concern with the mere possibility of litigation
does not make a document work product." 7 Rather, the court stated that the work-product doctrine is only applicable when "the

897 F.2d 1255 (3d Cir. 1990).
See id. at 1256.
. See id. at 1258 n.1.
112 Id. at 1266.
113 Id.
14 Rockwell Int'l, 897 F.2d at 1266.
109
110

I' 967 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1992).
16 See id. at 984.
117 Id.

19981

PROTECTION FOR CORPORATE WORK PRODUCT

preparer faces an actual claim or a potential claim following an
actual event or series of events that reasonably could result in
litigation." " 8
D. The Adlman Decision and Anticipation of Litigation
In light of these prior decisions, the Adiman case clearly breaks
new ground. All of the circuit court cases discussed above sought to
limit the scope of the work-product doctrine either by reference to
the primary purpose for which the material was prepared or based
on the likelihood and imminence of prospective litigation. Adlman,
however, expressly rejects the "primary purpose" limitation and
almost as clearly rejects the idea that prospective litigation must be
imminent or reasonably likely in order for documentation to qualify
for work-product protection. The result is a very broad protection
for all material that may be causally connected to concerns,
thoughts, or fears of prospective litigation. The only limit expressly
recognized by Adlman is the "ordinary course of business" exception, and even that is narrowly construed to apply only to documents that would have been produced in substantially similar form
without the prospect of litigation.
Writing for majority, Judge Leval clearly demarcates the Second
Circuit standard from the "primary purpose" analysis of the Fifth
Circuit and rejects the latter standard. He states:
We believe that a requirement that documents be produced primarily or
exclusively to assist in litigation in order to be protected is at odds with
the text and the policies of the Rule. Nowhere does Rule 26(b)(3) state
that a document must have been prepared to aid in the conduct of litigation in order to constitute work product, much less primarily or exclusively to aid in litigation. Preparing a document 'in anticipation of litigation"
is sufficient." 9

The documents at issue in Adlman seem to have had a dual
purpose: both to aid in the planning of the proposed merger and to
evaluate and prepare for the prospective IRS litigation that would be
brought about by the merger. 12 Given the court's legal analysis, it
did not have to determine which purpose was primary. The language of the opinion goes further, however, and strongly suggests

I
119

Id.
United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1998).
See id. at 1197-98.
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that a document prepared because of litigation, but which is created
solely for business purposes, is still protected by the work-product
doctrine. 12 ' This would seem to be the import of the court's
statement that:
We see no basis for adopting a test under which an attorney's assessment
of the likely outcome of litigation is freely available to his litigation adversary merely because the document was created for a business purpose
rather than for litigation assistance. The fact that a document's purpose is
to the question whether it should be
business-related appears irrelevant
1 22
protected under Rule 26(b)(3).

In short, the purpose for which a document was prepared now
appears to be irrelevant in the Second Circuit when determining
whether a document qualifies for work-product protection. The
dispositive question is whether the documentation at issue would
have been prepared in "substantially similar form but for the
prospect of litigation." 2 3
This "but for" standard of causation, however, raises the familiar question of how remote and attenuated the causal chain can be
and still have legal significance. Will the Second Circuit follow the
Binks and National Union cases and limit work-product protection
to situations where the prospective litigation is likely and not remote? It seems clear that the Adlman court will apply work-product
immunity to documents analyzing litigation arising from events that
have not yet occurred. On the facts of AdIman, although litigation
with the IRS was seen as virtually certain if the merger went through
and the tax refund claim was asserted, the merger and tax refund
or 'driving' force
121 Indeed, several decisions cited by Adiman discuss the "primary'
behind the creation of the document in applying the Wright and Miller test. Id. at 1202
(citing National Union Fire Ins. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir.
1992) (adopting the Wright and Miller test but noting that [d]etermining the driving
force behind the preparation of each requested document is [ ] required in resolving a
work product immunity question.1); Binks Mfg. Co. v. National Presto Indus., 709 F.2d
1109, 1118-19 (7th Cir. 1983) (adopting the Wright and Miller test, yet relying on primary purpose case law to determine the applicability of the work product doctrine); see
also Rockwell, 897 F.2d 1255, 1266 (3d Cir. 1990) (relying on the Wright and Miller
test and then inquiring into the motivating factor behind the creation of the document).
The thread connecting those decisions to Adlman is the consistent application of a broad
fact-based inquiry in applying work product protection. See, e.g., id. (extending its examination beyond the motivating factor in the creation of the document to the other elements of the work product doctrine). A more accurate couching of the case law depicts
El Paso and Adlman as existing on different ends of the anticipation of litigation spectrum.
122

Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1200.

Id. at 1195.
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claim were, themselves, contingent events that had not yet occurred
and whose occurrence was completely under the control of those
asserting the work-product claim. In that sense, the prospect of
litigation in Adiman was substantially more contingent and remote
than in Binks or similar cases where the events which were to give
rise to the litigation had already occurred at the time the documents
were prepared. Yet, the Second Circuit, unlike the court in Binks,
was willing to grant work-product protection to such
documents." 4
Adiman expressly holds that documents prepared in connection
with events that have not yet occurred can have sufficient causal
connection to prospective litigation arising from such events to
warrant work-product protection."' This does not mean, however,
that the contingent nature of such events is irrelevant to work-product analysis. Indeed, Adiman states that "non-occurrence" is a "factor to be considered."" 6 Judge Leval further noted that work-product protection would be available, "where a party faces the choice
of whether to engage in a particular course of conduct virtually
certain to result in litigation and prepares documents analyzing
whether to engage in the conduct based on its assessment of the
likely result of the anticipated litigation." 7 This statement is consistent with the view that some kind of probability assessment still
limits the Second Circuit's causation analysis. Documents based on
litigation arising from contingent future events may be work product, but only when litigation is "virtually certain" to follow from the
occurrence of such events. While this is a plausible reading of

124 In most instances, work product protection is applied where there is a case pending or when a specific event has already occurred that makes litigation a distinct possibility. See, e.g., National Union, 967 F.2d at 984 (requiring an actual claim or an actual event to apply work product protection); Binks, 709 F.2d at 1120 (denying work
product protection where no threat of litigation had been made when the document in
question was prepared). The only other circuit court case that might be construed as
extending work product to documents prepared prior to the occurrence of events giving
rise to the litigation is Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Department of Justice, 823
F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1987), but that case arose out of a very different factual setting involving a criminal investigation by the Justice Department. In most respects, Adlman appears to be on the outer edge of the work product spectrum in construing the imminence requirement of work product protection.
12 Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1196 ("Although the non-occurrence of events giving rise to
litigation prior to preparation of the documents is a factor to be considered . . . it does
not necessarily preclude application of work-product privilege.1); see also supra Part I.
126 Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1196.
127 Id.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64: 2

Judge Leval's opinion, it is by no means the only one. Given the
concern for protecting a lawyers' theories and analyses that pervades the opinion, it is equally likely that Judge Leval would even
apply work-product protection to a tax planning document which
considered possible IRS challenges to a proposed transaction and
found the likelihood of such a lawsuit remote, so long as it
contained lawyers' thought processes and legal theories.
The one limitation on the application of the work-product
doctrine which the Adiman court explicitly recognizes is the exception for material prepared in the ordinary course of business." 8
Here too, however, the Adiman court created a new formulation designed to reconcile the Wright and Miller test with the ordinary
course of business exception. In remanding the case for further
findings, the Second Circuit directed the district court to determine

128 Documents that are prepared in a company's ordinary course of business or pursuant to regulatory requirements are not generally shielded by the work-product doctrine.

See generally MOORE ET AL, supra note 33, § 26.70[3][b], at 26-212; WRIGHT & MILLER,

supra note 7, § 2024, at 346. This principle is found in the Advisory Committee's notes
to Rule 26(b)(3) and, despite pointed criticism, has been deemed an exception to the
work-product doctrine. See Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397, 401 (8th Cir.
1987); United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 542 (5th Cir. 1982); McDougall v.
Dunn, 468 F.2d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 1972).
Several courts and commentators have asserted that the ordinary course of business
standard undermines the purpose of the work-product doctrine by enabling an adverse
party to obtain the work, thoughts, and opinions of counsel that would otherwise be
protected had the document been prepared outside of the ordinary course of business.
See, e.g., Carver v. Allstate Ins. Co., 94 F.R.D. 131, 134 (S.D. Ga. 1982); APL Corp. v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 91 F.R.D. 10, 18 (D. Md. 1980); Fontaine v. Sunflower Beef
Carrier, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 89, 92 (E.D. Mo. 1980); Anderson et al., supra note 49, at 84849. See generally Wilson, supra note 46.
The exception is premised on the notion that litigation is an omnipresent possibility
in American life, and that it would therefore undermine the liberal discovery standards
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to prevent discovery whenever a company routinely prepared documents for merely hypothetical litigation contingencies. See National
Union Fire Ins. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir. 1992)
('[B]ecause litigation is an ever-present possibility in American life, it is more often the
case than not that events are documented with the general possibility of litigation in
mind.'); Wilson, supra note 46, at 597 ( Providing work product protection to materials
merely because they were prepared by an attorney would create a dark veil of secrecy
over most of what a company does and would negate the policy of giving discovery a
broad and liberal application."). As a result, 'courts use [the ordinary course of business
exception] to limit the protection given to internal documents of large manufacturing and
insurance companies and to documents prepared by nonlawyers." Anderson et al., supra
note 49, at 848.
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/whether [the memorandum] would have been prepared irrespective
of the expected litigation with the IRS."' 29 It went on to explain
that:
If the district court concludes that substantially the same Memorandum
would have been prepared in any event-as part of the ordinary course of
business of undertaking the restructuring-then the court should conclude
the Memorandum was not prepared because of the expected litigation
and should adhere to its prior ruling denying the protection of the
Rule. 3'

Note that this standard demarcates the line between documents
prepared in the ordinary course of business (and, therefore, unprotected by work product) and documents prepared because of litigation (which fall under the work-product protection)."' Using this
analysis, documents prepared in the ordinary course of business are
not exceptions to the work-product rule but simply fail to meet the
'because of" litigation standard. Analyzing whether a document is
prepared in the ordinary course of business or for litigation is
common in the work-product case law.' 32
What is new about the Adlman decision is the court's indication that a document is not prepared in the ordinary course of business if it or its substantial equivalent would not have been created
but for the prospect of litigation.'33 Adlman gives no guidance as
to how different a document needs to be from its ordinary business
counterpart in order to confer work-product protection. For example, one can easily imagine, on remand, that the district court in
Adiman would conclude that even absent the threat of IRS litigation, Arthur Anderson & Co. would have been asked to produce
some document providing advice concerning the proposed restructuring, but that absent the IRS litigation threat it would have focused
on entirely different concerns. Under the "substantially similar" test,
the content of such a hypothetical document would be highly relevant in determining whether work-product protection applies to the
document that was actually created.
Finally, it should be noted that the ordinary course of business
limitation reintroduces concepts of business purpose that Adlman
otherwise banishes from work-product analysis. Indeed, it is quite
'
130

Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1204.

Id.

31 See id.

See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
"' See Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1195.
132
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conceivable that the Adiman court might have reached the same
result that the Fifth Circuit came to in El Paso by focusing not on
the purpose of the documents but on their preparation in
connection with regulatory requirements. 34
IV.

ADLMAN

AND

WORK-PRODUCT

PROTECTION

FOR

CORPORATE

DOCUMENTS

This Part considers the effect of the Adiman standard on the
application of work-product protection to a variety of corporate
documents, contrasting it with the primary purpose test where relevant to illustrate more fully the differences, similarities, and scope of
the new standard. This comparison is easy to do with Adiman because Judge Leval specifically discussed the potential impact of the
new standard on some common corporate documents, in particular,
risk-management assessments, investigative reports, and opinion
letters. However, while the Adiman opinion expands work-product
immunity for each of these types of documents, the extent of such
expansion and its interrelationship with the ordinary course of
business and regulatory compliance exception must still be
evaluated.
A. Risk-Management Documents
For the purpose of this Article, a risk-management document
can be defined as one in which the impact and merit of potential
litigation is assessed with respect to proceeding with a certain business decision. Under the primary purpose test, such documents
were only subject to protection when the litigation motivations
were shown to outweigh the business purposes for creating the
documents. 3 ' This was likely to be difficult to establish, particularly when substantial revenue hinged on the decision whether to
proceed with the planned course of action.' 36 The "because of"

13 See supra note 29 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Rockwell
Int'l, 897 F.2d 1255, 1266 (3d Cir. 1990) (relying on the Wright and Miller test and
denying work-product protection to tax documents similar to those in El Paso and
relying on the regulatory exception to work product).
135

See supra Part III.A.

See Harper v. Auto-Owners Ins., 138 F.R.D. 655, 661 n.2 (S.D. Ind. 1991) ('Documents prepared for concurrent purposes . . . should not be classified as work product.'); Scott Paper Co. v. Ceilcote Co., 103 F.R.D. 591 (D. Me. 1984) (denying work136
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litigation standard, however, potentially offers considerably more
refuge for risk-management documents under the work-product
umbrella. Indeed, Adiman itself involved such a risk-management
document. 37
A question left open by the Adiman court, however, is the full
effect of regulatory requirements on risk-management documents.
Many risk assessments by public companies are done to comply
with periodic disclosure requirements. The Second Circuit, pursuant
to the ordinary course of business exception, indicated an aversion
to conferring work-product protection on documents prepared in
response to governmental regulation.'38 However, while the court
indicated resistance to such work-product claims, it merely deemed
them "arguable." 139 Indeed, a flat denial of work-product protection to such documents would contradict Adlman's driving principle
that work-product questions are necessarily fact-driven causation
inquiries that preclude bright-line rules. 4
Corporate law departments routinely prepare memoranda regarding clients' disclosure obligations: when to disclose; what constitutes material information needed to be disclosed; or whether to
go forward with an initial public offering given the attendant discovery obligations of such an undertaking. On the one hand, Adiman
seems to recognize that blanket work-product protection of all such
routine documents would undermine the aims of liberal discovery
by threatening to shield nearly all corporate documents. 4 ' However, when a corporate action is contemplated and a memorandum
is prepared discussing whether the action is material and must be
disclosed pursuant to SEC reporting regulations, and assessing the
likelihood of a private or SEC lawsuit if no such disclosure is made,
it is difficult to see how protection for such a document could be

product immunity to a risk-management document where its primary purpose was to
address business considerations). See generally United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d
530, 543 (5th Cir. 1982) (balancing business concerns against litigation issues).
"'1Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1200 (We see no basis for adopting a test under
which . . . [discovery is permitted] merely because the document was created for a
business purpose rather than for litigation assistance."); see also American Optical Corp.
v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 426, 431 (D. Mass. 1972) (providing work-product protection to risk-management letters regarding patent infringement).
S3
See supra note 29.
139 See supra note 29.
14o Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1203 n.6 (construing Second Circuit precedent and disavowing a "categorical rule' for work-product).
14,See supra Part I.
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denied consistent with the decision in Adiman. Perhaps it would
make a difference if the prospect of litigation from such disclosure
or nondisclosure were virtually certain.
The key to acquiring work-product immunity for such regulatory documents is demonstrating that such documents would not have
been prepared in "substantially similar" form but for the anticipated
litigation.142 In Adiman, the court suggested the removal of the
Sequa memorandum from the ordinary course of business exception
precisely because the document's make-up was substantially different from the company's ordinary business documents. 143 The bar

of work-product immunity for documents prepared pursuant to regulation stems from the same sentence in the Advisory Committee
notes to Rule 26(b)(3) as the ordinary course of business exception.' 4 If corporate documents-substantially modified in response
to a virtually certain prospect of litigation-are exculpated from the
ordinary course of business exception, then the same doctrinal protection is conceivably available for regulatory documents that are
substantially different than the norm due to the virtually certain
prospect of litigation. 45
Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1195 ("Where a document was created because of anticipated litigation, and would not have been prepared in substantially similar form but
for the prospect of that litigation, it falls within Rule 26(b)(3)."); see also Cochran v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 909 F. Supp. 641, 645 (W.D. Ark. 1995) (providing workproduct protection to documents that substantially deviate from normal business documents). Deviation from the normal business document or routine can be achieved in a
number of ways, including: involvement of outside counsel, or special treatment by inhouse counsel.
141See Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1202 ('[Ilt should be emphasized that the 'because of'
formulation that we adopt . . . withholds protection from documents that are prepared
in the ordinary course of business or that would have been created in essentially similar
form irrespective of the litigation.").
144 See supra Part II.
640 F.2d 49, 61-62 (7th Cir.
141 See In re Special September 1978 Grand Jury (11),
142 See

1980); see also Maertin v. Armstrong World Indus., 172 F.R.D. 143, 148 (D.N.J. 1997)
('The work product doctrine clearly precludes the protection of documents . . . pursuant
to public requirements unrelated to litigation .

. . .)

(emphasis added). Special Septem-

ber involved two subpoenas to compel discovery of a law firm's reports and documents
stemming from its representation of a not-for-profit trade association. The firm had assisted the association in filing a state mandated campaign contribution report which had
neglected to disclose certain funds. See Special September, 640 F.2d at 53. The association was simultaneously indicted by a grand jury for illegal political campaign contributions. See id. The Government claimed that the work-product doctrine was inapplicable,
as Illinois law compelled the preparation of documents sought by the subpoenas. See id.
at 61. The Seventh Circuit held that the documents were prepared in anticipation of
litigation since a concrete prospect of litigation existed throughout the grand jury indictment, despite the fact that the documents were also prepared according to Illinois report-
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B. Investigative Reports

Investigative reports-documents that examine the cause of an
infraction or accident-receive diverse treatment by courts with
respect to work-product protection.'4" Specifically, insurance re-

ports and non-insurance reports receive disparate work-product
treatment."' The linchpin for the analysis of these documents is
whether the investigative report, which almost invariably will have
been created in part because of prospective litigation, can be
classified as falling within the ordinary course of business." 8
First-party insurance adjusters' reports are generally held to fall
outside the scope of work-product protection, as the insurer owes a
duty to the insured to prepare the report. 4 Thus, under the
Adiman standard, such documents would have been prepared irrespective of litigation. Third-party insurance claims fare better in the
work-product realm. The touchstone for third-party insurance investigative reports appears to be whether there is a concrete prospect
of litigation when the claim is prepared. ° Insurance reports are
also more likely to be protected when the accident in question is of
such a nature that litigation is a foregone conclusion.' 5' Because

ing requirements. See id. at 61-62 ('[I]t is clear that the law firm knew before it began
to prepare the reports that the Grand Jury as well as the Illinois State Board of Elections
wanted information concerning political contributions by the Association.'). Work-product
protection, however, was ultimately withheld due to the association's fraudulent conduct.
See id. at 63 ("I'Jhe Association cannot invoke the work product doctrine as to the
subpoenaed documents because of its prima facie fraud in the filing of the reports.').
ee generally MOORE Er AL, supra note 33, § 26.7013][c], at 26-213 (detailing
1
judicial treatment of investigative reports).
47 See MOORE ET AL, supra note 33.
See generally MOORE ETAL, supra note 33.
149 See MOORE ET AL, supra note 33, at 26-213 to 26-214 ("The rationale is that
when an insured presents a first party claim, the insurance company owes the insured a
duty to adjust the claim in good faith, and there is no initial contemplation of litigation.') (citing Weitzman v. Blazing Pedals, Inc., 151 F.R.D. 125, 126 (D. Colo. 1993)).
" See MOORE ET AL, supra note 33, at 26-215 ('If the probability of a lawsuit is
immediately apparent to the claims adjuster upon initially surveying the incident, it is
likely that the court will find that the investigative report was prepared in anticipation of
litigation.').
I See MOORE E- AL, supra note 33. (oIf the probability of a lawsuit is immediately
apparent to the claims adjuster upon initially surveying the incident, it is likely that the
court will find that the investigative report was prepared in anticipation of litigation.')
(citing Raso v. CMC Equip. Rental, Inc., 154 F.R.D. 126, 128 (E.D. Pa. 1994)); see also
Suggs v. Whitaker, 152 F.R.D. 501, 506 (M.D.N.C. 1993) (protecting insurance investigation documents when the accident was of a nature that litigation was virtually certain to
occur).
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such reports often have a dual purpose-serving insurance
companies' daily business transactions and responding to litigation-the Second Circuit's rejection of the primary purpose standard
is likely to make more of such reports subject to work-product
protection

152

Non-insurance investigative reports pose issues similar to those
found in risk-management documents. Again, the business purpose
of such reports has traditionally been a basis for denying them
immunity."' 3 The more business driven the report, the less likely
that work-product immunity will be granted. 4 Under Adiman,
this factor is likely to become less important and other factors, including the involvement of counsel, which distinguishes documents
prepared because of litigation from those prepared in the ordinary
course of business, are likely to assume added significance.' s Deviations from the ordinary course of business, such as special treatment by counsel or a particularly glaring prospect of litigation for
the specific event, may augment the chances of achieving workproduct immunity. 6
132 Compare United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that
dual purpose documents may still be protected by the work-product doctrine when such
documents would not have been prepared but for litigation concems), with United States
v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that a dual purpose document
can be stripped of work-product protection when litigation purposes are outweighed by
other concems), and Snyder v. Winter, 159 F.R.D. 14 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that
accident reports must be prepared exclusively for litigation and not in the ordinary
course of business).
1"3 See MOORE ET AL, supra note 33, § 26.70[3][c], at 26-216 ('Even in cases in
which a specific claim is involved, if there are other, equally strong reasons for preparing the report, such as product improvement, safety of future product users, or avoidance of adverse publicity, courts will generally require production of the report.') (citing
Soeder v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 90 F.R.D. 253, 255 (D. Nev. 1980) (precluding workproduct immunity for an investigatory aircraft accident report due to overriding business
incentives for preparing the report)).
"s See supra Part Ill.A; see also Resnick v. Am. Dental Assoc., 95 F.R.D. 372 (N.D.
III. 1982) (holding an intemal sex discrimination investigation unprotected by work product, as it was primarily business driven).
1"3 See McMahon v. Eastem S.S. Lines, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 197, 198-99 (S.D. Fla. 1989)
(applying work-product protection to a fire investigation report when outside counsel was
brought in instead of involving regular counsel). But see E.E.O.C. v. Commonwealth Edison, 119 F.R.D. 394, 395 (N.D. II1.1988) (applying the primary purpose test and denying work-product immunity when there was no indication of a break from routine procedure in preparing a discrimination investigation report).
13 See Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1195-96 (discussing the intensive legal focus of the
memorandum and the "virtually certain" prospect of litigation); see also Cochran v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 909 F. Supp. 641, 645 (W.D. Ark. 1995); Raso, 154 F.R.D. at
129 (protecting investigative reports by an insurance investigator when the accident in-
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More specifically, the Adiman decision raises interesting questions with respect to investigatory reports that arise in conjunction
with governmental agency investigations. First, it remains unclear
whether independent investigatory reports that are initiated before a
government agency notifies a company of a potential infraction are
covered by the work-product doctrine."s7 Second, it is unclear
whether reports of investigations taken pursuant to orders by a
government agency can nonetheless receive work-product
immunity.s 8
Adiman is likely to make it easier to extend work-product immunity to reports prepared by a company before any governmental
investigation takes place, particularly if it can be shown that the
company knew a supplemental government investigation was virtually certain to occur.'59 Indeed, the memorandum in Adlman is
analogous to such a hypothetical, in that Sequa contemplated a
volved "catastrophic' injuries).
157 Reports created after a government agency contacts a corporation have been conferred work-product immunity. See Maertin v. Armstrong World Indus., 172 F.R.D. 143
(D.N.J. 1997) (applying work-product protection to investigatory reports prepared while
the company was under governmental investigation); Martin v. Monfort, Inc., 150 F.R.D.
172 (D. Colo. 1993) (protecting internal studies prepared subsequent to the Department
of Labor's contacting a corporation to inform the business that Fair Labor Standards Act
violations may exist).
'5
At least one court has protected an internal study conducted after a regulatory
agency instructed the company to conduct the study in question and when that regulatory agency had rules compelling disclosure of such materials. See Martin v. Bally's Park
Place Hotel & Casino, 983 F.2d 1252 (3d Cir. 1993). Martin was a chemical exposure
case in which a Bally's bartender, Martin, developed a skin condition in response to
chemicals maintained around the bar. Martin reported the exposure to the Occupational
Health and Safety Administration ('OSHA'). See id. at 1254. OSHA was too busy to
pursue Martin's complaint and eventually instructed Bally's to investigate and correct the
infractions to avoid litigation with OSHA. See id. Bally's counsel ordered an investigation and a report was generated as a result. OSHA demanded a copy of the report and
threatened action in lieu of a failure to disclose. See id. at 1254-55. Bally's refused to
disclose, claiming, inter alia, work-product immunity. Complicating Bally's work-product
claim was the fact that OSHA maintained a 'records access' rule, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1020, which "requires employers to make available to OSHA . . . records which
the employer [ ] voluntarily generate[s] . . . [including] 'exposure records,' which include
records monitoring toxic substances in the workplace.' Martin, 983 F.2d at 1256 (citing
29 C.F.R. § 1910.1020(c)(5)-(6)). However, the court concluded that the records access
rule incorporated work-product protection. See id. at 1258. Turning to the work-product
issue, the court noted that routine reports created to comply with OSHA requests would
normally be excluded from work-product immunity, but held that the instant report was
not a routine report, as "substantial evidence supports the conclusion that [Bally's counsel] reasonably anticipated litigation at the time he commissioned it.' Id. at 1261.
"' Recall that governmental investigations may constitute "litigation' for the purposes
of work-product analysis. See supra note 52.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64: 2

merger which it was virtually certain the IRS would investigate.
Hence, Adiman again appears to push the boundaries of the workproduct doctrine deeper into the corporate realm.
Similarly, if a corporation is virtually certain that a governmental agency will compel an investigation upon the occurrence of
some conduct, Adlman leaves open the potential of work-product
immunity for legal analyses produced prior to the occurrence of that
conduct.
Complicating the government-compel led investigation hypothetical is the possibility of regulatory requirements that such documents be routinely created. The presence of a regulatory duty raises
issues encountered in the risk-management document evaluation
discussed above, 6 ' namely, whether a document that is substantially different from a document routinely produced will qualify for
work-product protection under the Adiman standard.
C. Opinion Letters
Lawyer opinion letters-those required by securities law or
accounting standards to be sent by corporate counsel to an independent auditor for financial reporting purposes-have largely been
denied work-product immunity in prior cases.' Such documents
not only run afoul of the primary purpose test, since they are invariably prepared primarily for some purpose other than litigation, but
would also seem to fall squarely within the exception for documents prepared in accordance with regulatory requirements. 62
Accordingly, even courts applying a more lenient work-product
standard than the primary purpose test have been reluctant to confer
work-product immunity on opinion letters.' 63

160 See supra notes 137-44 and accompanying text.
16 See generally Melissa D. Shalit, Note, Audit Inquiry Letters and Discovery: Protec-

tion Based on Compulsion, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1263 (1994). Opinion letters from
counsel to client that assess the client's litigation prospects are a different matter and are
generally protected work product if the letters are sufficiently connected to the prospect
of litigation. See, e.g., Hager v. Bluefield Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 170 F.R.D. 70 (D.D.C.
1997); Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp. v. Imoco-Gatgeway Corp., 62 F.R.D. 454 (N.D. Ill.
1974).
162 See United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d 292 (Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. 1985)
(denying opinion letters work-product protection, as the primary purpose was SEC compliance); McEwen v. Digitran Sys., Inc., 155 F.R.D. 678 (D. Utah 1994) (same).

1 See, e.g., Garfinkle v. Arcata Nat'l Corp., 64 F.R.D. 688, 690 (S.D.N.Y.

(precluding work-product protection due to the regulatory exception).
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Yet Adiman included a hypothetical in which Judge Leval felt
an opinion letter might well be entitled to such protection. He
envisioned a situation in which:
A business entity prepares financial statements to assist its executives,
stockholders, prospective investors, business partners, and others in evaluating future courses of action. Financial statements include reserves for
projected litigation. The company's independent auditor requests a memorandum prepared by the company's attorneys estimating the likelihood of
success in litigation and an accompanying analysis of the company's legal
strategies and options to assist it in estimating what should be reserved for
litigation losses. 1 "

Judge Leval concluded that under such a scenario, "the protection of the Rule should be accorded to such studies in these circumstances." 65 Judge Leval's hypothetical mentions preparation of financial statements which include reserves for projected litigation. It
would seem he is envisioning documents prepared regularly in the
ordinary course of business, perhaps even pursuant to regulatory
statutes. Of course, Judge Leval does not state that the reserve figures, themselves, would be protected. Protection would only be
accorded to the lawyer's letter to the auditors which, in his hypothetical, also contains information about legal strategies and options.
Still, the extension of work-product protection to such documents,
even if periodically written in accordance with regularly prepared
financial statements, would seem to narrow the ordinary course of
business exception substantially.
The Adlman hypothetical regarding audit letters underscores
the Second Circuit's emphasis on protection of counsel's thoughts
and legal theories to insure free communication and preparation for
trial 166 and properly notes that even protecting drafts of opinion

letters can serve such goals. Nevertheless, when such documents
are prepared as a standard part of a corporation's regulatory compliance, it is likely that they are beyond even the broad reach of the
Adlman work-product doctrine.'67

16

United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1200 (2d Cir. 1998).

165 Id.
'6
167

See supra Part I.

See supra note 29.
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CONCLUSION

It will likely be a long time before the real significance of
Adiman can be fully assessed. Issues of privilege tend to be determined by district courts and discovery masters. They are fact intensive and subject to very limited review. Yet, the Second Circuit's
mandate in Adiman is clear and unequivocal. Documents containing legal theories, analyses, and opinions regarding prospective
litigation are to be protected from disclosure from opposing parties
in order to maintain the basic integrity of the adversarial system.
Reading opposing counsel's assessment and theories of litigation,
even when such assessments are made well before any actual lawsuit, should be like reading someone else's mail, an activity neither
condoned nor facilitated by the courts.
The danger of Adlman, however, is in its very expansiveness,
in the reluctance of the court to impose any clear limits on what
kinds of documents can be plausibly linked to future litigation and
thus fall under work-product protection. One can easily imagine
corporate lawyers trying to shield much of their work from subsequent disclosure by labeling their comments on draft contracts as
Iiassessments of prospective litigation claims" and their drafts of SEC
disclosure language as "recommendations for avoiding prospective
securities litigation." As Judge Kearse noted in dissent, such corporate advice will be protected by attorney-client privilege, when
contained in confidential attorney-client communications.168 When
not so contained, it is unclear why it should be protected at all. To
the extent that Adiman becomes a means of expanding the protection of legal advice far beyond the traditional scope of the attorneyclient privilege, it will not be a salutary development.
However, it may well be that the ordinary course of business
and regulatory exceptions which Adiman retains will be sufficient to
prevent any expansion of work-product protection from getting out
of hand. While Adiman is a powerful statement of the continuing
vitality of the work-product doctrine, it is hardly the last word on
the subject.

'6 See Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1205 (Kearse, J., dissenting).

